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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

### "NATIONAL" VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:

A Comparative Analysis

CIA/SRS-3



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This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 30 November 1956.

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## FOREWORD

This paper is offered as a contribution toward the critical evaluation of the prospects for World Communism. It attempts to analyze the phenomenon known as National Communism in contrast to International Communism. The discussion is presented primarily in conceptual and speculative terms, leaving for subsequent consideration such pragmatic features as the power struggle within the Communist leadership and the aspirations of the non-Soviet peoples of the Communist Bloc.

Although the primary purpose of the paper is to analyze National Communism, it also presents a tentative evaluation and projection of that development in relation to U.S. security interests. Finally, it examines a number of hypotheses concerning the possible effects of National Communism on the world movement.

In the past, the Communist leaders have rigidly maintained the doctrine of the "inevitable downfall of capitalism". There is ample evidence that they still cherish this belief, even though its falsehood has been proved in the past, as it will be in the future. On our part there appears to be a growing tendency to expect an "inevitable downfall of Communism". This paper submits a number of reflections which cast doubt on the validity of this expectation.

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"NATIONAL" VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:  
A Comparative Analysis

Introduction: Background

1. When Marx and Engels, in 1848, conjured up the "specter of Communism", they envisaged it as an international phenomenon, even though they thought of it primarily with respect to industrial countries where a proletariat languished under the exploitative whip of Capitalism. Moreover, contrary to Communist claims, Marx and Engels were inexperienced in the techniques of revolution. They did not outline a clear plan of action for the implementation of their theses.

2. It was Lenin who first conceived of methods to carry out Marxist Communism. Lenin's concept of internationalism was much broader than that of Marx-Engels. He saw Communism as a world force but he did not assume that it would, of necessity, be directed by one hegemonic power. He displayed no contempt for small countries but, rather, insisted on "fraternal" relations among CPs all over the world. It was only at the end of his life, and of course under Stalin's auspices, that the organization of

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World Communism, the Comintern, came to be dominated by the CPSU and that Soviet supremacy emerged in the Communist world.

3. Stalin's concept of International Communism differed considerably from that of Lenin. His belief that "Socialism can be established in one country" prevailed over the far more cosmopolitan concept of Trotsky, who insisted that a "permanent revolution" must continue until Communism had triumphed throughout the world. Stalin, after having defeated Trotsky, set out to consolidate the gains of Communism in the USSR, and to make it the "base" of World Communism. On the basis of his success in the USSR, he concluded that "Socialism" had to be built on the Soviet model, and that the CPSU, controlling the USSR, must command the fealty of all CPs throughout the world. Under his guidance the Comintern became the instrument of Soviet Communist leadership until World War II. By that time it had outlived its usefulness, and propaganda considerations dictated its dissolution. The doctrine of Soviet leadership of World Communism had been firmly established, and the movement could now be adequately guided by the less militant instrumentality of the Cominform, or directly by the CPSU.

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4. In Stalin's lifetime, Soviet control of International Communism was breached twice: first, by Tito's establishment of an independent type of Communism following Yugoslavia's ejection from the Cominform; and second, by Mao Tse-tung's speedy conquest of the Chinese mainland which did not conform to Soviet historical and ideological patterns.\* In both cases, the Stalin regime found itself unable to prevent what amounted to deviation from the orthodox line. Although they created dangerous precedents, these breaches of solidarity had no significant effects on the Stalin regime.

5. After Stalin's death, the rigid conception of what constitutes deviationism was loosened, and the more flexible Leninist view of relations among "fraternal" Communist parties was found better adaptable to prevailing conditions. This return to Leninism was furthered by the recognition that the Stalinist type of administration had compromised the progress of International Communism, thereby harming USSR interests, and, in any case, would fail

\*Chief among these is Mao's thesis of the peasantry as the spearhead of the Chinese revolution as opposed to the Leninist concept that only the industrial proletariat could and should furnish revolutionary leadership.

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without a Stalin. Neo-Leninism was hastened by the realization that the nuclear stalemate made imperative the implementation of a new Communist strategy if the ultimate goal, Communist world conquest, was to be achieved.

6. Concessions to the Satellites and to other components of International Communism throughout the world were made for two reasons. First, it had become essential to permit the blowing off of nationalistic steam and to loosen economic stringencies in an attempt to strengthen loyalties to the USSR and Communism. Second, it was found necessary, in pursuit of the much advertised relaxation of tensions, to present a more respectable front to non-Communist areas, especially the Afro-Asian neutralists. Being well aware that non-Communist governments look at Communist organizations as conspiracies, the Kremlin strove to make them appear as national political parties. In carrying this concept to its logical conclusion, it tacitly admitted that "proletarian internationalism" was not sufficient to secure the loyalties of the parties and sympathizers in the satellites and abroad nor the respect of peoples in the free world. Thus it was led to allow for considerations of national particularities in "building socialism".

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### Terminology

7. This new approach is loosely called "national Communism", a term which has serious defects. Communism, if it is to remain true to its long term objectives, must be "international". So-called national Communism is less a form of nationalism than a regional or local interpretation and application of Marxist-Leninist theory, opportunistically adapted to achieve certain strategic objectives. In contrast, international Communism insists on a rather uniform interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist gospel, which can emanate only from Moscow; leadership of the Soviet Party and State is held to be imperative if Communism's final victory is to be won. The emergence of national Communism has introduced new elements into Communist dialectics. Indeed, ever since Malenkov's introduction of the "new course", the 20th CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's "secret" speech, there has been growing unrest, confusion and uncertainty in the Communist world. The 30th June CPSU Resolution sought to reduce the disturbance, but with only limited success.

8. National Communism is not a uniform phenomenon. Its manifestations vary in every state where it has been wholly or

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partially adopted. If the independent conduct of foreign relations is the keystone of sovereignty, only Yugoslavia can be described as genuinely national Communist. Communist China remains too deeply committed to Soviet foreign, economic and military policies to be counted among the genuinely national Communist states. Moreover, China believes that its own experience can serve as a valid model for the development of Communism in large areas of the world, and thus it will probably avoid overemphasis on the thesis of "multiple roads to Socialism". Poland has adopted many features of national Communism but it cannot have an independent foreign policy and it remains closely bound to Bloc economy. The Soviet concept of the satellites as a cordon sanitaire does not permit independent implementation of individual foreign policies which might run counter to Moscow's interests. Therefore, the Eastern European satellites patently cannot have full national Communist status. National Communism in the satellites is bound to remain limited to mere trappings of sovereignty, although they may be allowed to depart from the Soviet model in certain aspects of internal political and economic organization and methods.

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9. In analyzing the Soviet position toward national Communism, it must first be recalled that the 30 June Resolution calls for "ideological unanimity and fraternal solidarity of the Marxist parties" and strongly implies that this requirement takes precedence over "national peculiarities and the conditions of each country". A PRAVDA editorial of 15 July states that only "among the politically immature and over-credulous may there be some who would fall for this claptrap of 'national Communism'." Again on 24 July, PRAVDA linked ideological diversity with the old errors of "reformism" and thundered:

"To believe that the peculiarities introduced by individual peoples into their movement along the road to socialism can assume forms of estrangement in the field of ideology is to draw a monstrous caricature of reality . . . "

Three days before, on 21 July, Bulganin had exhorted the Poles in Warsaw:

"We cannot disregard the attempts to weaken the international ties of the socialist camp under the banner of so-called 'national peculiarities', attempts to sap the might of the people's democratic state under the banner of a dubious 'extension of democracy'."

On the other hand, it is significant that the Yugoslav Party paper BORBA, just two days before Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade, con-

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demned by implication the intransigence of the 30 June

Resolution:

"Cooperation among socialist forces cannot be limited to questions of practical politics or to the peace struggle. It must be based on sincere belief in the existence of various ways to socialism. . . Any centralistic organization of socialist forces - even if it were freed completely of hegemonic tendencies, which never has been the case - can only harm socialist development . . . "

10. This contrast between the Soviet and Yugoslav concept of Communism has been highlighted by recent events in Poland and Hungary. The 30 June Resolution outspokenly stipulated that concessions to "independence" of states and parties were contingent upon abiding loyalty to the "socialist" cause as the USSR understands it. Nevertheless, the pronouncements of the 20th Congress which the Soviet leaders have frequently reiterated, have created a cleavage between "national" and international Communism. An attempt will be made in this paper to analyze the differences between these two types of Communism and to evaluate the findings in the light of US security interests and possible future developments.

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The Essential Characteristics of International Communism  
and National Communism: A Comparative Analysis

Ideology

11. Belief in the Marxist-Leninist ideology is a fundamental requirement for every Communist. The universal adoption of this secular religion is the avowed goal of Communism, and its acceptance by Communists throughout the world gives it an international basis, despite national diversities.

a. The Stalinist concept of International Communism presupposed a central direction for all the components of world Communism. The Soviet model was to be followed and no deviation was permitted. Among the Communist parties, the CPSU was the unique fountainhead of wisdom and ideological interpretation; the Communist bloc was a monolithic unit, firmly welded along political, economic and military lines. This extremely rigid doctrine has, indeed, been loosened by Stalin's successors, but the Soviet position of pre-eminence in the Communist World has not been relinquished.

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b. National Communism is also based upon Marxism-Leninism but it qualifies this adherence by claiming its own right of doctrinal interpretation in accordance with local conditions and national self-interest. Moreover, while it still looks to the USSR as primus inter pares of the Bloc, it no longer feels bound to follow the Soviet model exclusively in "building socialism".

#### The Party

12. The unique status of the Communist Party is the cardinal doctrine of Leninism which international and national Communism both acknowledge. The Party is the "spearhead of the revolution" and the indispensable leadership organization during the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without it, the Communist state is unthinkable.

a. The Leninist concept of the Party requires absolute domination over the organs of government. Stalin, during the pre-war period of his rule, followed this doctrine and as General Secretary of the Party,

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was doubly interested in enhancing its power for his own purposes. However, after World War II, the concentration of State and Party leadership in Stalin's person brought about some diminution of Party influence; Stalin was the Party and he left it little maneuverability. The Statutes of the 19th CPSU Congress indicated this decrease of the Party's power position and the deterioration of its Leninist character. Stalin's death abruptly ended this development. Once again, the Party became supreme. In this respect, the "return to Leninism" was genuine.

b. The status of the Party under national Communism cannot be defined so clearly; it varies with the type of leadership and the geographical location. For example, in countries contiguous to the USSR or Communist China, the Party's power tends to be greater than in Yugoslavia. Generally, national Communism's trend toward decentralization of administration and economy would tend to make the Party a high level guide whose primary task is to provide broad



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counsel instead of detailed orders. As a result, the executive power of government, especially in implementing overall policies, would increase and lead to more articulate divisions between Party and State. Nevertheless, the body politic of a national Communist state remains within the framework of the one-party dictatorship, even though its Party apparatus is more flexible and accommodating to the State's requirements. Since Party and government are interlocking and are often represented by identical officials, no State-Party antagonism or clash of interests need arise.

#### Economy

13. In the fields of economic planning and organization, the differences between international and national Communism come into clearest focus. It is here that the interests of the Soviet state may collide with those of other Communist states, regardless of ideological affinities.

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a. The USSR, leading international Communism, has sought to build a monolithic bloc economy in which detailed economic tasks and norms are assigned to each member. A CEMA-type\* of organization probably is considered essential for directing and coordinating the overall Kremlin plan. Strengthening the Bloc economy by "scientific" planning also strengthens the Soviet economy and thereby assures the position of the USSR as the "base" of World Communism. This concept of a Communist economic master plan does not appear to have been abandoned in the turbulent course of post-20th Congress events. The doctrinal "liberalization" proclaimed at the Congress applies only to the methods employed by individual countries to fulfill their "norms" and not to the basic roles of their economies.

\* CEMA, i.e. Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, is a Moscow controlled organization, set up for the purpose of coordinating and integrating satellite economy with that of the USSR, in accordance with Moscow's economic master plan for the Orbit.

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b. National Communism regards its own economic welfare as basic to the survival of Communism within its own borders and, by extension, of Communism throughout the world. It resents Soviet economic dictation with its depressing effect on local living standards. It does not accept the pace of industrialization imposed by international Communist doctrine, nor the principle of compulsory agricultural collectivization. It does not seek to eliminate government control of national economy nor to initiate non-socialist methods. But it tends to leave the implementation of the nation's master plan to local enterprises, to decentralize the national economy and to direct its efforts toward better living conditions rather than the achievement of specific Soviet assignments. However, the economies of such national Communist countries as already exist are comparatively weak and, with the exception of Yugoslavia, trading possibilities with non-Communist countries are as yet quite limited. Thus, satellite states, even if they were to establish national Communist regimes, would still be obliged to depend on Soviet help which could be obtained only if they remained within the Soviet economic empire. But even if

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they became less dependent on Soviet assistance, they would hardly be permitted to break out of CEMA.

Intra-Communist Coordination

14. Leninism presupposes close cooperation between Communist governments and parties throughout the world. It considers the integral and total coordination of policies and tactics to be imperative, embracing the political, economic, military, sociological and cultural fields. Implicit in this approach is the subordination of national interests to Communist objectives.

a. International Communism adheres to this line. The Communist Bloc is to be strengthened by economic integration (cf. above, 13. a.). Its military organization aims at coordinating Communist forces throughout the Bloc with those of the USSR in such fields as training, weapons parity and centrally directed strategy. International Communism seeks to identify "national" defense with defense of the Bloc in general and the USSR in particular.

b. National Communism tends to accept a certain degree of coordination but is wary of total integration. It

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aspires to deal with the USSR as nation to nation, in the traditional sense, hoping to minimize CPSU intrusion. It is willing to accept a close affiliation of Bloc economies, provided this will not adversely affect its own economy and living standard. It will accept Soviet military aid and counsel, since it needs weapons and technical advice which it cannot obtain from the West. But it opposes the infiltration of its armed forces by Soviet officers and technicians. In general, it does not believe that its own nationalism must of necessity be suppressed in order to achieve Communist objectives; it sees possibilities for combining national with Communist interests according to Togliatti's concept of "polycentrism". It might agree that there should be ideological unity but would hold that this does not have to impair national independence.

#### The Class Struggle

15. The doctrine of the class struggle which would end only after the destruction of the bourgeoisie, capitalism and imperialism, has been one of the cardinal points of Marxism-Leninism.

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a. For international Communism, this concept is basic and untouchable. It is not subject to super-structural changes. To relinquish the class struggle would be like renouncing the creed of dialectics. The November 1956 issue of the CPSU magazine PARTINAYA ZHIZN' reiterated that "the construction of socialism is impossible without a class struggle". This struggle is not always possible by means of open aggression or violence; it must also be carried on through a vast program of subversion, sabotage, infiltration, espionage and propaganda. In the non-Communist world, Party cadres, underground organizations and Communist fronts are in charge of implementing Communist policies, with the CPs acting as transmission belts for Soviet orders. Within the Bloc, naked force will be unhesitatingly applied, as the Hungarian example has shown, wherever the doctrine shows signs of deviating toward "reformism".

b. National Communist regimes are first of all concerned with the consolidation of their own independence, standard of living and social problems. It may therefore

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be assumed that domestic energies will be spent on internal reconstruction rather than on an activist class struggle to which lip service will be paid in a perfunctory manner. The issue of the international class struggle will remain, for a while at least, in abeyance, but will not be formally abandoned so long as Marxism-Leninism continues to be the guiding ideology. Given a chance, national Communist regimes may seek to influence and win the cooperation of labor movements in non-Communist countries and to exploit nationalistic aspirations of the "neutral" or uncommitted nations. As national CPs acquire the appearance of respectable political parties in many parts of the world, they may no longer be looked upon as conspirators and may have excellent prospects for building up united fronts with Socialists.

The Meaning of International and National Communism for US Security

16. In estimating the significance of different types of Communism for US security, it is necessary to differentiate

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between short and long range effects. In the near future, a monolithic Communist bloc under Moscow's leadership would obviously be far more dangerous than a decentralized, or "polycentric" group of national Communist states, primarily concerned with their own welfare and unlikely to indulge in Communist missionary work abroad. But in the long run, Soviet absolutism in the Communist orbit, unless greatly modified, might further undermine the loyalty and reliability of the satellites and possibly lead to the deterioration of Communist Parties in the Free World. On the other hand, a polycentric league of Communist nations, based not only on a common ideology but also on similarity of national interests, voluntarily cooperating and working toward eventual Communist victory along independent lines, might prove to be extremely dangerous for the US and its allies. Such a league might appear most attractive to the neutralist nations, many of which are already tending toward socialism.

17. It is true that the concept of National Communism, despite basic Soviet objections (see para. 9.), has made some headway. Events since Stalin's death have unquestionably

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shocked many of the faithful, and have created contradictions within the Communist world. However, this should not obscure the prospect that Communism, led by two large and powerful countries, will eventually absorb the blows which it has received since the 20th CPSU Congress. National Communism will probably continue to be an element of disturbance and contradiction, but it will nevertheless remain basically loyal to Marxism-Leninism and will work toward eventual destruction of evolutionary democracy.

18. The short range aspects of Communism's threat to US and Western security, if measured in terms of International and National Communism, may be outlined as follows:

a. With the help of its organizational weapons, International Communism will continue to stimulate unrest in the political, economic and cultural fields. Even though the Soviet Communist leaders probably seek to avoid general war, owing to the nuclear threat, to their economic needs, and to the realization that the Satellites are not reliable, they will continue to use their military establishment directly or indirectly as an instrument of

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pressure both inside and outside the Bloc. Such pressure might be used liberally in conjunction with other means of political warfare, since the Kremlin probably discounts the likelihood of Western nuclear retaliation. It probably considers that it can pursue activist policies much farther without running into unacceptable risks.

b. National Communist states, on the other hand, are less likely, for the time being, to initiate or follow reckless policies. They must consolidate their gains, strengthen their economies and firm up their "independence". Moreover, they seek an end of Soviet occupation and the ouster of Soviet nationals who have penetrated their armed forces as advisers, technicians and officers. Nevertheless, it is possible, and even probable, that the national Communist states will have to play the role of respectable fronts for Soviet manipulations. It is conceivable that such activities may not necessarily be recognizable as such by national Communist regimes or avoidable if Moscow orders them.

19. In the economic field, the interests of Soviet and

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national Communisms are at variance. On the one hand, the USSR will continue to strive for maximum influence on the economic policies of the satellites and for the further integration of the Bloc. On the other hand, economic necessities in national Communist countries will overshadow, for the time being, ideological affinities and beliefs. If the USSR remained adamant in limiting satellite economic contacts with the Free World, economic deterioration could lead to more unrest, rebellion and serious dislocation within the Soviet orbit. Such policy, obviously, would not be in the best interest of the USSR. By permitting the satellites some economic rapprochement with non-orbit countries, the USSR might achieve certain benefits to itself, despite the risks involved in exposing them to non-Communist influence. In any event, the effectiveness of the Bloc - whether monolithic or polycentric - will remain impaired so long as serious economic deficiencies exist in the Satellites.

20. In the military field the Hungarian events have demonstrated that Moscow can no longer be confident of the reliability of the satellite armed forces. Recognition of this situation should modify the Western estimate on the anti-Communist resistance

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potential, at least for the near future. Continued Soviet absolutism would probably perpetuate and deepen the unreliability of Satellite forces. However, a polycentric organization of nominally independent national Communist states, enjoying relatively decent living conditions and the symbols of nationhood, might change the mood of these forces and perhaps even permit the eventual development of greater reliability.

21. If developments should favor progress toward independence and local deviations from the Soviet model (such as the end of agricultural collectivization), the gulf between the USSR and national Communist countries might widen, thereby strengthening national pride, and weakening established doctrines. Such developments could, in the end, lead to a loosening of Communist solidarity, even though an appearance of bloc unity vis-a-vis capitalism and imperialism might be maintained. The need of national Communist countries for peace and economic improvement would undermine the Leninist character of the regimes and promote efforts toward a modus vivendi with the non-Communist world. It is questionable, however, whether

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the Soviet Communists would permit such a situation to develop. So long as Communism can uphold the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, with its implacable hostility to the "imperialistic" West, the Sino-Soviet Bloc in ideological, economic and military respects probably will eventually regain its cohesiveness.

Some Hypothetical Future Developments

22. There is ample evidence that the post-Stalin methodological changes and the revision of certain unrewarding Stalinist policies not only have left untouched the basic structure of the Soviet concept of state and society but have considerably enhanced the strength of the CPSU, which still remains the "spearhead of revolution". There is further evidence that genuine Titoism, specifically the independent conduct of foreign affairs, is confined to Yugoslavia and that the 20th Congress doctrine of "various roads to socialism" will be forcibly watered down in those satellite states which are part of the Soviet cordon sanitaire. Thus national Communism, so-called, may well serve as a strategic auxiliary of the USSR and as a propaganda weapon for Soviet purposes in Asia and Africa to boot. The lesson taught

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the CPSU by Stalin's attitude toward the Yugoslav deviation has been learned and applied. Can those changes, permitted in satellite states as well as in the Communist Parties outside the Communist orbit, leave residues which may, in the long run, affect the character of Communism? And if so, in what way and to what extent? While it is, of course, impossible to foresee such developments with any degree of accuracy, the following hypothetical thoughts are submitted for consideration. A return to Stalinism proper probably is believed inadvisable by the Soviet leaders under present conditions. Leninism provides the Kremlin with a policy sufficiently elastic and aggressive to cope with a variety of developments which may result from the end of the Stalinist imperium. Ruling out the resumption of Stalinism, the following possibilities present themselves:

- a. Pursuant to Lenin's thesis of "fraternal relations" among Communists, and in literal fulfillment of the theses of the 20th Congress, monolithic control of satellites and CPs abroad might be relinquished in favor of mere ideological affinity. True national "independence" and development toward

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"socialism" according to prevailing local conditions would be taken for granted. Such a depolarization of Communism, together with internal decentralization, would increasingly remove national Communist states and parties from Moscow's control and influence. Indeed, it could result in a retreat from Leninism toward a far more moderate type of socialism and an inevitable rapprochement with the Free World. Moscow is unlikely to permit such a development to happen within the Bloc, since this would endanger Soviet physical security and contribute to a deterioration of Communism throughout the world. It might even use force to prevent it.

b. Lenin's idea of "democratic centralism" might be adapted to international use in a polycentric system of nominally "independent" Communist states. Such a system would still adhere to the doctrine that "socialism" can be built in various ways within a Communist league, albeit under Soviet leadership. This association of states would remain rather loose, for the time being. Its professed principles would be that socialism is better than capitalism,

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that capitalism is inevitably doomed, and that a new order must be established based on the socialization of all means of production. These Marxian theses, propagated by an organization of nominally independent states, might well exert a tremendous influence in those areas where socialism is considered the only solution of contemporary problems. Since many countries in Asia, Africa and part of Europe are now in this category, a "socialist" commonwealth, even though obviously Soviet directed, might have a good chance to extend its influence gradually throughout most of the world. Its success and effectiveness would depend, of course, on the willingness of the Eastern European satellites to play their part, on the extent and character of Tito's cooperation and on the participation of Communist China and its Far Eastern satellites. It would further depend on the stability and strength of the Moscow regime and its ability to carry out "liberalization" measures on the one hand, while successfully preventing secession of member states from the Soviet orbit on the other hand. Without Com-

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munist China's cooperation, a Communist commonwealth would be limited to Eastern Europe and would offer far less attraction to non-orbit nations.

c. The Soviet leaders might decide that the creation of a Communist commonwealth would not be a satisfactory implementation of the new Leninism. They might, instead, put severe limitations on national Communism, granting only marginal independence to the satellites, while displaying a more liberal attitude toward Titoist countries not contiguous to USSR territory and toward parties in the free world. However, there would remain the problem of organizational control. It is not impossible that, if Moscow believed the time for tighter control had come, a new type of Comintern might be established. In this case, concessions to Titoism would probably have to be made, in order to avoid splitting the Communist nations into several blocs.

d. There is also a possibility that the Kremlin might conceive of a polycentric transition period as a gigantic tactical maneuver. After having served the purpose of getting Communist nations closely together under Soviet auspices,

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the "Socialist Commonwealth" would be led back, more or less gradually, into a monolithically ruled Communist bloc. It must be assumed that the Soviet leaders remain convinced that they alone can lead the way to the goal of a classless society and that, until that is reached, on grounds of tradition and of their power position, they must not let their control slip away. Such a development could conceivably result in a neo-Stalinism. However, it probably would be considered feasible only after most or all of the neutralist nations in Asia and Africa had joined the "Socialist Commonwealth".

#### Conclusions

23. Recent events in Eastern Europe and, previously, the apparent relaxation of Soviet aggressiveness, have given rise to some hopes that Communism has degenerated and may be at the beginning of its end. In our judgment, however, there is no indication that Communism is dying, even though it may be temporarily "indisposed". The Soviet leaders, armed with

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the faith of Marxism-Leninism, and a great power potential, have the resources and the determination to prevent a Goetterdaemmerung of Communism. Their present favorable position vis-a-vis the former colonial and semi-colonial countries provides an additional, strong element of potential support. However, the appearance of Communism has changed and is changing. Such changes have frequently occurred in the past. They have often seemed to indicate a retreat from basic ideology but never actually were. They simply indicated that in order to make better progress, different methods were being employed or different strategic objectives established. In the past, confusion and dissension resulting from such shifts have always been overcome. There is no reason to assume that this will not be the case again. Whether, as has been suggested, the ferment created by recent events will result in an ultimate erosion of Communism remains to be seen. It is suggested, however, that current events do not provide reliable clues to long-range Communist developments. Historical experience has shown that the convulsions of relatively new movements have often been instrumental in their strengthening and resurgence, albeit in different forms.

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24. If individual national Communist states should prove viable in the next few years, a conversion of the centrally controlled Communist empire into a "commonwealth" or league of cooperative and partially coordinated national states would increase the total capabilities of the Communist sector of the world during the next generation. The measures presently being used at the initiative of the Soviet leaders are contrived to assist the national sectors of the Soviet orbit to solve their more pressing internal, administrative and economic problems and thereby to develop a more stable, productive and reliable society.

25. Granted the primary fact of national Communism, namely, that each state will be run by its own Party and government, we believe that the common ideological positions, the personal associations of the leaders, the increasing power of the USSR and the comparable social, agricultural and industrial problems facing each of the member states provide a reasonably solid basis for continuing cooperation and for a common attitude toward the non-socialist parts of the world. We therefore conclude that national Communism per se does not give us any basis to hope for a decline of Communism in the foreseeable

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